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Summary  findings
The issue of the credit crunch in the aftermath of the  further qualification is needed. The increase of the
Asian crisis has stimulated much debate. Indeed, some  spread might simply reflect a rising risk premium
features of the East Asian economies, such as bank-based  triggered by the fact that the negative shock reduces the
financial systems and high leverage, make them  net worth  of economic agents because of larger financial
particularly vulnerable to monetary and financial shocks.  outlays. Accordingly, the relevant spread to capture the
Under such circumstances, the credit channel of  worsening credit conditions that affect bank-dependent
transmission of these shocks is likely to lead to a credit  borrowers is the spread between bank lending rates and
crunch, affecting the flow of bank loans to those agents  corporate bonds. The yield spread between corporate
- households and small and medium-sized enterprises  and government bonds measures the general risk
- for whom close substitutes for bank credit are  premium.
unavailable. In turn, the disruption to the availability of  The study applies this methodology to Indonesia,
finance for bank-dependent borrowers may stymie  Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and
economic activity.  Thailand and shows that the credit crunch is widespread,
In practice, however, it is difficult to detect the credit  while its negative impact particularly affects small banks
channel effects that lead to a credit crunch. Reliance on  and enterprises. On the basis of the findings, the authors
trends of credit aggregates alone is inadequate to prove  claim that:  (1) a protracted  and heavy reliance on tight
that there has been an adverse shift in the supply of  monetary policy, entailing high real interest rates,
loans: even a decline or slowdown of credit could stem  appears inappropriate  for restoring market confidence;
from a decrease or deceleration in demand. A frequently  (2) it is desirable to consider alternative policy
used methodology to overcome this problem focuses on  instruments that do not place further stress on the
both credit aggregates and the yield spread between bank  banking sector and on its lending to the corporate sector;
loans and risk-free assets, such as government bonds. If  and (3) policy actions are warranted  to alleviate the
this spread rises while credit aggregates slow down, one  strain that the crisis has put on small banks and
can conjecture that the supply of loans has either  enterprises.
decreased more or increased less than demand. But
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31. INTRODUCTION
It is a subject of controversy whether the East Asian crisis-stricken countries are
suffering from a credit crunch.  While there is anecdotal evidence that even good firms
are  finding  it  difficult  to  obtain  credit  to  finance  production  and  investment,
macroeconomic  data  on  monetary  and  financial  developments  do  not  unequivocally
support the assertion that a credit crunch is occurring. A better understanding of this issue
is crucial for the designing of appropriate policy actions and for the recovery prospects
for  the  East  Asian  countries.  For  example,  it  is  widely  held  that  after  currency
devaluation, recovery will be led by export-driven demand, entailing a relevant transfer of
resources from the non-traded to the traded sectors.'  Yet, a pervasive credit crunch could
retard or even jeopardize such a transfer, thus undermining recovery prospects.
This paper aims to shed some light on whether and to what extent the East Asian
countries are currently  suffering from  a credit crunch.  First, we propose  a systematic
framework to  evaluate  the  occurrence  and  the  magnitude of  the  credit  crunch.  In
particular, we make reference to well established literature studying the transmission of
shocks through the credit channel, often referred to as the credit view. 2 We draw on this
literature to  help identify the channels through  which the negative shocks hitting  East
Asia may have propagated the credit crunch in these economies.  This framework allows
us to deploy a consistent approach in analyzing the issue across all countries and to go
beyond exclusively relying on macroeconomic indicators and anecdotal evidence, which
are often in contradiction.  The framework also enables us to assess how credit crunch
affects differently across the various  sectors  of the economy.  Second, we  apply the
framework to five East Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand.
See JP Morgan  Economic  Research  (1998) and IMF's World  Economic  Outlook  (1998) for more on
this.
2  Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a comprehensive  discussion  of the credit channel and its
components.  This  type of literature  is based on the assumption  that informational  asymmetries  play a
major role in financial  markets. See also Mishkin (1991) who studies financial crises from an
historical  perspective
4The results from applying the framework show that the region is suffering from an
overall credit crunch, although the situation differs considerably across the countries in
question.  In Korea and Malaysia, where banks adjusted their rates more rapidly to rising
money market  rates, the  wedge  between  lending rates  and  risk-free  asset yields  has
significantly widened, indicating an increasing strain on credit supply by banks through
the price mechanism.  In the other countries, the credit squeeze has been rendered more
through quantity rationing than through increases in lending rates.  Furthermore, in all
countries for  which relevant detailed data  were readily  available  showed unequivocal
evidence of a flight to quality: banks shifting towards less risky assets (e.g. government
securities); depositors turning to those banks perceived to be more secure (i.e., foreign
banks, large banks, and state owned banks).  All in all, this evolution appears to pose
serious threats particularly to the financing of small and medium sized enterprises, and to
sectors most affected by informational asymmetries.
The paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 introduces our strategy to assess the
existence of the credit crunch, while Section 3 presents the empirical results  obtained
from applying the framework to the data gathered for the five countries.  The last Section
summarizes the main results and points to possible avenues for future related research.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
2.1 Beyond the Key Indicators of the Monetary Policy Stance
Under normal circumstances, examining the evolution of the key macro variables
--e.g. the relationship between  monetary  aggregates, interest rates, or other monetary
policy instruments and nominal  income -- may be  sufficient to evaluate the monetary
policy stance.  If the key monetary policy instrument(s) are not in line with expected price
and output developments (i.e., nominal production potential), then it can be concluded
that the monetary policy  stance is  excessively tight (loose)  since there is  less (more)
liquidity than is needed to accommodate nominal production.
In a situation of crisis, however, assessing the monetary policy stance becomes
complicated  as  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy  instruments  and  nominal
5income changes drastically.; Accordingly, it may be misleading to focus solely on key
indicators of monetary policy for the purpose of detecting "a credit crunch".  Analyses of
monetary  and  credit  aggregates  need  to  be  complemented  with  a  more  detailed
investigation of the channels through which firms, banks, and households are affected by
changes in monetary policy.  In fact, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue, when the
economy is hit by a negative shock, it is often impossible to distinguish whether the usual
deceleration in bank lending stems from a shift in demand or supply.  On the one hand,
the  corporate  sector  may  be  demanding  less  credit  because  fewer  investments  are
undertaken; on  the other  hand,  it  could be  that  banks  are less  willing  to  lend  and,
therefore, charge higher interest rates or decline more credit applications.
In order to address this problem of identification, we will rely on literature that
examining the transmission of monetary policy restrictions through the credit channel.  In
particular, we will focus on the evolution of the spread between bank  lending rates and
rates on risk-free assets (see Bernanke and Blinder,  1988).  To Return to the example
above, once we  recognize that  lending  has  shrunk while  the  spread  has widened,  it
becomes clear that demand for loans could not have declined more than loan supply.
2.2  The Propagation of the Credit Crunch
According to  the  Council of  Economic Advisors  (1991),  credit  crunch is  "a
situation in which the supply of credit is restricted below the range usually identified with
prevailing  market interest rates and the profitability  of investment projects".  When a
credit crunch occurs,  it alters the relationship between credit  availability  and  interest
rates. A credit crunch mostly occurs in two forms: (i) a leftward shift of the credit supply
curve at a given interest rate level (price mechanism), and  (ii) rationing  of the credit
supply, irrespective of interest rates (non-price mechanism; Box  1 and Box 2 provide
more details on the credit crunch concept).
Identifying a credit crunch in practice involves investigating the channels through
which firms, banks, and economic activity are affected.  For instance, both increases in
6the cost of borrowing and credit rationing is likely to lead businesses  and households  to
shelve some investments  or current expenditures  for which funding  is no longer available
or has become  too costly.
Box.1
DEFINING CREDIT CRUNCH
"Credit crunch" as a concept is often ill-defined and  casually employed.  Many people use the
term "credit crunch" loosely and in an interchangeable way to describe a variety of phenomena including
"tightening of monetary policy", "shortage in the supply of funds", and "credit rationing by banks"  etc.
Even in the literature concerning credit crunch, there doesn't appear to be a general consensus on a precise
definition for the "credit crunch" concept.  It is, therefore, useful to explore more carefully the concept of
"credit crunch" and to differentiate various terms describing credit conditions, particularly the difference
between credit slowdown and credit crunch.
A  credit slowdown  can be  defined  as  a general  decline in  credit growth  that  may  have been
generated by either demand or supply factors, or both.  Broad changes in the demand for credit may be
cyclical (varying with the pace  of economic activity) or structural (induced  by changes in the  tax code
etc.).  Credit supply can be  influenced by  changes  in financial regulations,  structures, and  institutions.
Monetary policy and autonomous shifts in lender and borrower psychology will have an impact on both
credit supply and demand.
Unlike  credit slowdown, which  is  a fairly general  term,  credit  crunch specifically  refers to  a
reduction in the available supply of credit.  During a period of credit crunch, lenders become reluctant to
lend either because of  funding problems  stemming  from  disintermediation, or because  regulators have
urged  credit restraint  The  reluctance  to  lend  may  also  stem  from  the  lenders'  own  balance  sheet
weaknesses (capital constraints) and  their reassessment  of borrowers'  average  credit quality.  Although
credit crunches are often deemed as primarily supply phenomena, it is difficult to disentangle supply from
demand effects since some of the same factors that reduce the willingness to lend may  also restrain the
desire to borrow.
A credit crunch implies changes in the relationship between credit availability and interest rates:
(i) less credit may be available over a wide range of interest rates -- a condition consistent with a leftward
shift in a  credit supply schedule, or (ii) the reduction in credit availability may bear little relation to the
level of rates -- a condition that takes place when allocation occurs via non-price mechanisms.  Since credit
is normally allocated across potential borrowers by the interest rate, the term credit rationing is commonly
used for situations in which the supply of credit is allocated through non-price mechanisms.  In general,
credit rationing episodes are considered to be a subset of credit crunches in which the interest rate is not the
price  underlining  the  credit  allocation  mechanism.  Credit  crunches  that  are  characterized  by  credit
rationing may be difficult to alleviate through monetary policy alone.
Source:  Draws  on Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New York  Quarterly  Review,  Spring  1993.
72.2.1  Increases in the Cost of Borrowing
In a situation of monetary tightening and/or credit crunch, the external finance
premium  (the difference in cost  between funds  raised externally and funds  generated
internally to  the firm)  is  likely  to  increase,  thus  increasing  the  cost  of  borrowing.
Typically, this increase in the cost of borrowing is the effect of two channels: the balance
sheet channel and the bank lending channel. 3
Box.2
TYPES  OF CREDIT  RATIONING
Credit  rationing  can take the following  three forns:
(i) Pure rationing occurs when some borrowers  are denied credit while otherwise identical  borrowers
receive  credit. In this case, the lender  has set  an interest rate at which the demand  for funds exceed  the
supply;
(ii) Divergent  views rationing  occurs when borrowers  would like to borrow at prevailing  rates and feel
their loans  do not present  a serious  credit  risk, but the lenders  disagree  and refuse  to lend. In this situation,
borrowers  who cannot obtain credit at the prevailing interest rate may conclude that the lenders are
rationing credit.  Even when borrowers and lenders agree on the appropriate  criteria, they may have
different  forecasts  for future asset  prices  and cash flows;
(iii) Sectoral rationing  refers to the application  of credit standards  that effectively  shut off the flow of
credit to entire sector, such as certain classes  of borrowers  or types of borrowing. For some borrowing
sectors, lenders  may find it difficult to distinguish  between good and bad credits and therefore  choose  to
make no loans at all.  Sector rationing appears  in combination  with divergent  views rationing when
borrowers  have  private  information  or different  views  about their own creditworthiness.
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bank ofNew York  Quarterly  Review,  Spring  1993.
On the one hand, the balance sheet channel emphasizes the potential depressing
impact of the monetary squeeze on borrowers' assets and profits, including variables such
as borrowers' net worth, cash flow and liquid assets, which increases the risk premium.
The  increase  in  the  level  of  interest  rates  triggered  by  the  monetary  squeeze raises
corporate risks because it reduces both business profits and the value of assets firms have
posted as collateral.  This will generally increase the wedge between the interest rates at
which corporates can borrow and the yields on risk-free assets (See also Box 3).
For  the  US,  several  studies  provide  convincing  empirical  evidence  on  the
importance of the above mentioned interest rate spread.  More precisely, Kashyap, Stein,
3  See again  Bemanke  and Gertler  (1995) and Hubbard  (1994)  for a detailed  analysis.
8and  Wilcox  (1993)  show  that  in  general,  tight  monetary  conditions  bring  about  a
widening in the spread between commercial paper rate and T-bill rate; Gertler, Hubbard,
and Kashyap (1990), and Friedman and Kuttner (1993) document that an increase in the
spread is a good predictor of a subsequent decline in, respectively, investment and real
output.
On the other hand, the bank lending channel focuses more specifically on the
retrenchment  in  the  supply  of  loans  by  depository institutions  that  may  follow  the
monetary restriction.  In particular, the chain of actions runs as follows.  The monetary
squeeze raises the level of interest rates even for assets such as T-bills and Government
bonds which may be held to be risk-free, abstracting from sovereign risks that should
anyhow be undiversifiable for domestic agents.  In general, banks cannot increase deposit
rates  by  as  much  since  they  have  to  build  required  reserves  which  neither  bear
remuneration nor  offer a below-market yield.  This  entails that banks suffer a deposit
drain as investors reshuffle their portfolios away from deposits and towards assets with
more attractive yields. If, as is usually the case, banks are not indifferent between making
loans  to  the  private  sector  and  holding  Government  securities  --  i.e.  Government
securities provide a cost efficient way to carry a secondary liquidity cushion, banks may
be unwilling to deplete their holding of such securities below some threshold-- following
the deposit drain they will probably enact a restriction in  their loan supply.  Yet this
would not imply that bank lending rates should increase more than corporate debt market
rates if all firms were indifferent between borrowing at banks and  issuing debt on the
market.  In  reality, however, we know that  --even in  countries with  most  developed
financial markets like the US,  let alone countries with thin and rudimentary  financial
markets-- the majority of businesses do not issue debt on the market.  As a result, after
the monetary tightening we can expect that the wedge between bank lending rates and
corporate debt market rates may also increase (See also Box 3).4
4  A similar  impact  could  be induced  by the introduction  of stricter  regulations  on banks:  e.g. the
imposition  of higher  capital  adequacy  ratios Bernanke  and Lown  (1992).
9BOX. 3 1
SOME USEFUL CONCEPTS
The interest  rate paid by corporations  issuing  debt on the market  --the corporate  debt market  rate
(CDMR)--  can be expressed  as:
CDMR = RF + GRP  (1)
where RF is the risk-free rate and will be proxied  by the Government  bond yield or the T-bill rate, and
GRP stands  for the general  risk premium  for the private  sector and, by construction,  will be measured  by
the yield differential  between  corporate  and government  bonds (or the spread  between  commercial  paper
and T-bill  rates).
It also  is useful  to think  of the lending  rate (LR) as consisting  of three  components:
LR = RF + GRP + BDBSS  CDMR + BDBSS  (2)
where  RF, GRP, CDMR  have been defmed  above, and BDBSS  is the bank dependent  borrowers' specific
spread  and can be proxied  by the spread  between  the lending  rate and the yield on corporate  bonds (or the
spread  between  lending  and commercial  paper rates).
The following  graph schematically  depicts  what happens  as a result of the bank  lending  channel
and contrasts  it with the impact  of the flight to quality. The graph has the loan quantity  and the loan  rate
respectively  on the x and y axes.  Taking LDO  as the demand for loans as given, we hypothesize  for
convenience  that only te  loan supply moves: the bank lending channel effect is represented  by the
parallel shift from LSO  to LSI; instead,  the flight to quality effect is given by the shift with counter-
clockwise  translation  from LSO  to LS2.
r  LDO  LS2  LSI
10~~~~~~~~
10As an additional contributing factor besides the balance sheet channel and the
bank lending channel, banks may not only restrain credit generally but also adopt more
stringent lending policies vis-a-vis customers that are perceived to be less credit worthy --
a phenomenon labeled "flight to quality".  That is, when a deposit drain squeezes their
resources and/or credit risk heightens, banks will try to cherry-pick customers who are ex
ante more credit-worthy: e.g. those having a more established credit record or able to post
more collateral.  Whereas the bank  lending  channel may be  thought of  as a  parallel
leftward shift in  the loan supply, when  banks enact  a  flight to  quality,  however, the
leftward shift will not be parallel but it will penalize more the riskier borrowers, i.e. most
likely those who were already charged higher loan rates (See also Box 3).  In turn, as
stressed by Bemanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), the flight to quality in bank lending
may trigger a financial accelerator effect along the following causal chain: the negative
shock  precipitates  the  economy  into  a  recession;  the  recession  makes  borrowing
constraints tighter; tighter borrowing constraints amplify the recession, and so on.5
2.2.2  Credit Rationing
Whereas an assessment of changes in the cost of borrowing can be reasonably
accomplished, it is extremely difficult to identify and measure credit rationing in practice.
Intensifying credit rationing  is  certainly  a relevant  aspect in  the credit  crunch.  One
instance of credit rationing could be related to the flight to quality phenomenon that we
referred to above. Another form could be a reallocation of bank assets away from lending
to  the  corporate  sector,  and  towards  government  securities  and  foreign  exchange
instruments.
2.3  Sectoral Issues
While  sketching above the  channels through  which  monetary  tightening  and
credit crunch are transmitted to the economy, we have already made clear that some of
5  A model  deploying  financial  accelerator  effects  was proposed  by Kyiotaki  and Moore (1997). Lang
and Nakamura  (1995)  report evidence  of a flight  to quality  in bank lending  for the US.
11these effects have asymmetric impacts across the various classes of customers.  These
aspects deserve  further elaboration because  they have  important bearings on  how to
interpret the credit crunch and, especially, on which  policy  actions are best  suited to
mitigate its undesirable consequences.
The balance sheet channel in principle has a symmetric impact on the economy.
It raises the risk premium and thus the cost of borrowing for all firms, irrespective of their
financial  structure.  In practice, however,  even the balance  sheet channel  will likely
penalize the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) more since they typically do not
have access to the commercial paper market.
The lending channel and credit rationing specifically affect bank-dependent
borrowers, i.e. those firms that cannot directly place liabilities on the open market and
the equity market.  This should particularly be the case for SMEs. 6 In the first place, they
are too small to justify the fixed costs entailed by listing securities.  In addition, even
when they have the intention of issuing  debt on the  market, they would  most  likely
refrain from doing so because given the low liquidity of their debt, investors would ask
for very high yields, thus making issuance unattractive to SMEs.  SMEs would also be
specifically penalized by the flight to quality.  Lenders perceive them to be more risky
since they generally have a  shorter  track record  and typically  release  less --and  less
structured-- information. 7
Furthermore, when the credit crunch ensues, there may be an additional channel
negatively affecting SMEs in terms of availability and cost of external finance, that is
flight  to  quality  (safety)  by  depositors.  Envisaging  increased  fragility  of  the
intermediaries, depositors may shift their savings towards institutions that are perceived
to be less likely to go bankrupt.  For instance, foreign banks could be deemed safer than
domestic  ones;  smaller  banks  may  be  viewed  less  likely  to  be  bailed  out  by  the
6  Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1994) show  evidence  consistent  with this hypothesis.
7  Bemanke,  Gertler and Gilchrist  (1996) report evidence  consistent  with this hypothesis. A negative
bias similar  to that regarding  SMEs  might apply to fast-growing  firms, since  they have a higher ratio
of expected  future  profits  to the current  value  of physical  assets  and thus can provide  lower  collateral.
12government; and private barnks  are less likely than state-owned banks to be covered by
government guarantees.  Thus, an additional credit squeeze may hit those customers
borrowing  from  smaller  banks, 8 private  banks,  or  domestic  banks  which  are
suffering from the deposit flight, and typically SMEs depend more than other firms on
small, private and domestic banks'  lending. 9 The institutions which receive new flows of
funds often have  no established  relationship with  the  borrowers of  those  institutions
losing resources, and are thus less likely to make loans to those customers.
2.4  The Shocks Causing the Credit Crunch in East Asia
The key factors leading to the specific credit crunch in East Asia can be divided
into two broad categories: external factors stemming from the crisis itself and domestic
factors predominantly associated with initial policy responses.
A  major  reversal  of  international  capital  movements  took  place  in  1997.
According to  data  from the  Institute  of  International  Finance  (IIF),  net  international
inflows to the ASEAN 5 countries produced increasingly strong inflows reaching $93
billion in 1996. In 1997, there was an outflows of $12 billion, associated with the loss of
confidence in some of the EA countries.  Drawing on data from the Bank of International
Settlements and from IIF,  Radalet and Sachs (1998) estimate a capital outflow of $34
billion in the second half of 1997 -- a negative shock of 3.6 percent of GDP for the five
countries under consideration.  The short-term structure of their foreign borrowing was
also an important element behind the drastic reversal (Chart 1).
Unprecedented  exchange  rate  devaluation  (Chart  2)  provided  a  major
unanticipated shock (at least in its magnitude) to the corporate and financial sectors of the
EA crisis-countries.  This, in turn, multiplied the debt service burden  and gave rise to
s  Kashyap  and Stein  (1994, 1997)  argue that small  banks should be more  hit by monetary  restrictions
than large  ones.
9  Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) document a  strong correlation between relative size of the
lending  bank and relative  size of the borrowing  firm in the US: i.e. small firms tend to borrow from
small  banks  and large  firms  to borrow  from large  banks.
13extensive losses on the large part of unhedged corporate debt denominated in foreign
currencies. Widespread corporate distress also put a strain on financial intermediaries.
Tight monetary conditions were enacted to preempt further devaluation and avoid
hyperinflation. Increasing real interest rates (Chart 3) aggravated corporate distress and
bank fragility.  Excessively high interest rates (not justified by economic fundamentals)
can contribute to the credit crunch and aggravate financial instability mainly owing to the
following reasons (Mishkin, 1998):
i)  As  demonstrated by  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  and  by  several  other  studies,
asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem can lead to credit
rationing, a situation in which some credit-worthy borrowers are denied loans even when
they are willing to  pay a  higher interest rate.  As  rising interest  rates exacerbate the
adverse selection problem (the likelihood that the lender is attracting a bad credit risk),
banks restrict the loan supply, possibly leading to a substantial decline in investment and
aggregate economic activity  (Greenwald and Stiglitz,  1993).  Indeed,  some empirical
research shows that a small rise in the riskless interest rate can sometimes provoke a very
large decrease  in  lending and  even a  possible  collapse of  the  loan market  (Mankiw,
1986).
ii)  Increases  in  interest  rates  have  a  significant  impact  on  both  firms'  and
households' balance sheets.  A rise in interest rates heightens the debt burden causing a
deterioration  in  balance  sheets:  corporate  cash  flow  decreases  and  so  do  resources
available to finance spending for households carrying net debt positions.  Consequently,
the adverse selection problem becomes more severe for potential lenders to these firms
and households, again leading to a decline in lending and economic activity.
iii)  Rising  interest rates can also negatively affect banks, in turn,  possibly feeding
back to depress lending.  To the extent that the increased debt burden triggers widespread
failures,  the  quality  of  bank  loan  portfolios  deteriorates,  thus  weakening  banks'
capitalization.  In addition, banks typically borrow short and lend long: a rise in interest
rates may cause a decline in net worth (the interest rate rise lowers the value of assets
with longer duration more than it raises the value of liabilities with their shorter duration).
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153.  INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 10
3.1  Indonesia
The situation in Indonesia is controversial.  On one  hand, there is no striking
indication of a country-wide credit crunch on the basis of movements in monetary and
credit aggregates; on the other, strong sectoral shifts  in  the flows  offunds  occurred,
likely leading to bottlenecks in the availability offinancial  resources and to localized
credit crunch.
Chart 12 reports the value of returned checks as a percentage of checks presented
for clearing, generally a leading indicator of bankruptcies, and the mean value of returned
checks, which we would expect to grow when the composition of returned checks shifts
from household expenditures to corporate payments.  Both variables sizably increased in
the second half of 1997, suggesting widespread and severe corporate financial distress.
Chart I1
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10  Unless otherwise specified, all data are obtained from either the International Monetary Fund's  IFS or
from the respective countries'  Central Bank's  publications and Websites.  The sample period used
and the variables employed are determined by the availability of data from these sources.
Growth  rates are computed  on year-on-year  basis and  deflated by the CPI,  unless  otherwise  indicated.
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TRENDS IN RETURNED  CHECKS  REAL GROWTH  OF DEPOSITS,  LOANS, AND
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Deposit  growth  Loan  gowth  e  Foreign  share in funding
Chart Il  and I3 show that, contrary to what one might expect in a credit crunch,
loan growth was strong even in real terms and the ratio of excess reserves to deposits did
not increase.  Loan growth, however, was not financed via regular deposit growth (which
became negative in real terms), but  via funds denominated in  foreign currency whose
share on total resources --i.e. foreign funds/(deposits + foreign funds)-- strongly increased
from less than 30 to beyond 50 percent at the peak of the crisis." 2 Indeed, the negative
trend in deposits seems to reflect a widespread change in depositors'  attitude towards
banks and a declining desire to keep their funds in Rupiah.
Chart  14  Chart  15
RATIO OF EXCESS RESERVES  TO DEPOSITS  MARKET  SHARE TIME & SAVINGS DEPOSITS
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22  We include  in foreign  finds both foreign  currency  deposits  by residents  and banks' borrowing
abroad.
17The situation.of  "quasi-bank run" in Indonesia "  seems to be confirmed by the
fact that there was a substantial reshuffle in market shares.
Chart  16  Chart  17
LENDING AND DEPOSIT RATES  SPREAD IN LENDING-DEPOSIT RATES
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Chart 15 shows that between mid  1997 and the beginning of  1998 the share of
deposits  of state banks  (on which  depositors  may expect  the  Government to  cast its
support) went from 30 to 40 percent, and that of foreign banks doubled while that of
private national banks plummeted from almost two thirds to just above 50 percent.'4 This
seems  in  line  with  the  conjecture  of  a  flight  to  quality  (safety)  by  depositors  as
suggested above.
Therefore, the evidence that overall bank lending rates did not increase, but rather
diminished and became negative in real terms (Chart 16), needs to be interpreted with
some caution, given that various types of banks were specialized in lending to different
borrowers: i.e. state banks could be more oriented to lending to enterprises owned by the
state or having strong connections with the government, while the reverse could happen
for private national banks.  In particular, we may reasonably conjecture that customers of
(some) private national banks were hit more than others in terms of increasing cost of
credit (as Chart 18, shows lending rates did increase substantially more at private national
13  "Economic  crisis is eroding the faith of Indonesians  in their country's banking system. Depositors
respond  to every rumor, however  wild, by rushing to withdraw  their savings  from the neighborhood
bank"  from "Indonesia  Tries Mildly  to Fix Its Banks"  - The Economist  April 11-17,  1998.
14  A policy  recommendation  on this respect might  be to introduce  a deposit  insurance  scheme  that could
possibly  put an end to the hemorrhage  of deposits  out of private  banks, which are wrongly  perceived
as more  risky  because  they might  enjoy government  support  to a lesser  extent.
18banks than at state banks) and also in terms of increased probability of being credit
rationed (since resources available  to lend out were shrinking  at private national banks,
Chart 13). Finally,  the decrease  in the spread  between lending  and deposit rates has also
made Indonesian  banks more  fragile.
Chart  18
WORKING CAPITAL LOAN RATES BY TYPE OF BANKS
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3.2  Korea
There is evidence  supporting to the existence  of a credit crunch in the case of
Korea. There  are clear indications  that the credit crunch  has been  operating  through the
balance  sheet and lending  channels. There is also evidence  of aflight to quality by banks
(and  possibly by depositors)  as captured  by an increase  in banks' holdings  of government
securities  (and  a rise in the spread  between  CDs and  yield on government  bonds).
As a result of the serious structural inadequacies  --highlighted  by the liquidity
problems--  combined  with the adverse  consequences  of the crisis, Korea experienced  a
sharp decline in  industrial production at the  end of  1997 and, even further in  the
beginning of 1998 (Chart K1).  The downward  trend in share prices (Chart K2) also
19confirms the deteriorating economic conditions associated with structural weaknesses and
the crisis itself.
Chart  Kl  Chart  K2
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION  SHARE PRICES
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In order to both combat the inflationary pressures arising from won depreciation
and restore credibility of its foreign exchange and financial markets, the Central Bank has
liberalized and raised interest rates in January  1998.  The three-year benchmark bond
yield peaked to 22%  in the middle of January from 12% on the year-earlier period.  In
the meantime, banks reportedly became reluctant to lend and started calling in loans that
would have been rolled over in different circumstances.
The evidence from monetary and credit aggregates are not clear-cut on whether a
credit crunch occurred in Korea.  On the one hand, growth rate of real loans remained
positive (Chart K3), though there has been a downward trend since March 1997 and there
was a moderate downward trend in banks'  reserves in 1997, after the major reduction in
1996 induced by the lowering of the reserve ratios (Chart K4).  On the other hand, real
money  market  interest  rates  --  as  long  as  we  consider  CPI  actual  inflation  --  rose
substantially by the end of 1997 (Chart K5).
20Chart  K3  Chart  K4
GROWTH RATE OF REAL LOANS  THE RATIO OF BANKS' TOTAL RESERVES TO DEPOSITS
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The ratio of dishonored  checks  and bills to the total increased  to 0.52 at the peak
of the crisis in December  1997  from 0.17 in 1996  (an increase  of 206 percent),  indicating
the magnitude  and seriousness  of the financial  distress  in the country.
Chart  K5  Chart  K6
MONEY  MARKET  RATES  AND INFLATION  THE RATIO OF DISHONORED BILLS TO THE TOTAL
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Further investigation  shows  that Korea experienced  a sharp increase  in the risk
premium on  corporate debt, as  captured by  the  rising yield differential between
corporate  and government  bonds  (the domestic  risk-free  assets). Chart K7 shows  that the
yield differential  between  corporate  and government  bonds increased  from about 100
basis points until October to  197 b.p. in  November 1997, reached 899 b.p. in the
following  month at the peak of the crisis and declined  relatively  thereafter,  though it still
remained  very high (678 b.p., 453 b.p., and 378 b.p. during the first three months of
1998). This observation  suggests  the operation  of the credit crunch  through  the balance
sheet channel.
21The lending  channel effect  is also  at work: the  spread between the  overdraft
lending rate and the yield on corporate bonds increased since September, reached 13.2
percentage points in December 1997, and remained close to 6 percentage points during
the first two months of 1998.
The available data for the period from January 1996 to February  1998 provides
some evidence on the existence of a flight to quality in bank lending.  As can be seen
from Chart K8, banks have increased their holdings of government securities in relation
to  their assets during the period under consideration.  This is usually interpreted as a
signal of a decline in banks' willingness to lend as they devote an increasing part of their
assets  to  risk  free government  securities.  In  addition,  there  is  also  some  evidence
reflecting the perception of bank fragility on the part of depositors.  The spread between
bank issued CDs and the yield on government bonds (Chart K9) notably widened by the
end of 1997 and in the first two months of 1998.  In turn, this could be linked to a flight
to  quality  by  depositors,  as  they  shift  their  savings  towards  institutions  that  are
perceived to be less likely to go bankrupt.
Chart  K7  Chart  K8
SOME  INTEREST  RATE  SPREADS  THE RATIO OF  BANKS' HOLDINGS  OF GOVERNMENT
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3.3  Malaysia
The key indicators of the framework  lend support to  the existence of  a  credit
crunch  in Malaysia.  There has been a  significant increase  in both  the general risk
premium and the bank-dependent borrowers'  specific spread, reflecting the working of
balance sheet and lending channels.  The credit crunch appears to  be more acute at
Merchant Banks, specialized  in lending to SMEs.  There are  also signs of  a flight  to
quality both by banks and depositors, which further worsens SMEs'  ability to borrow.
Chart MI and M5 present the evolution of some key interest rates and inflation. It
should be pointed out that lending rates had been kept artificially low since the onset of
the crisis in order to cushion heavily indebted local companies from its full impact.  More
specifically, lending rates were pegged to the so-called base lending rates (BLRs)  -- the
rates commercial banks charge their best customers -- in August 1997.  The Central bank
lifted the cap on BLRs in November 1997.  By mid-December most banks were posting
BLRs of  10.35 (the permitted maximum), given that BLRs were once again tied to the
three-month average interbank rate of the previous month.
23CHART  Ml  CHART  M2
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Banks  are  heavily  exposed  to  portfolio  investors  who  have  used  shares  to
securitize their debts.  In fact, significant portion of the debt across the  economy  is
collateralized in this  way.  The plunge in equity  prices (Chart M2) has  devalued the
guarantees, obliging banks to demand that they be  supplemented, or that the debts be
acquitted.
The private sector is heavily geared: the average debt-equity ratio of Malaysian
companies is reported to be close to 200% -- well above international norms.  As a result,
the upward trend in interest rates in the wake of the crisis exerted tremendous financial
strains on heavily  leveraged companies by  substantially increasing  their debt burden.
Furthermore,  the  Government  recently  ordered  banks  to  limit  lending,  increase
provisioning  and adopt a  stricter definition  of non-performing loans  as well  as more
transparent  disclosure practices.  All  these  developments led to  a  decline in  lending
activities and an increase in banks'  excess reserves as illustrated by Chart M3 and Chart
M4.  It  appears  that  there  has  been  a  marked  increase  in  excess  reserves  held  by
commercial banks with the Central Bank in line with the government's above mentioned
orders and perhaps banks' inclination to restore their liquidity to more comfortable levels
in the event of large withdrawals.
24CHART  M3  CHART  M4
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CHART  M5
EVOLUTION  OF SOME KEY INTEREST  RATES
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Chart M6 and Chart M7 underscore that there has been a marked increase in both
general  risk  premium  and  bank  dependent  borrowers'  specific  spread  --  evidence
supporting balance sheet and lending channels.  The increase is more prominent in the
case of customers of merchant banks, compared to those of commercial banks.  Due to
the lack of data on corporate bond yields (and commercial paper rates) it is impossible for
us to  decompose the  wedge  between lending  rate  and  risk-free  yield  into  GRP  and
BDBSS.
25CHART M6  CHART  M7
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As indicated in Chart M8, there has also been a notable increase in the spread
between 1-year time deposits  and yield on government bonds  since June  1997.  This
highlights a rising perceived riskiness of banks and thereby could be linked to a flight to
quality by depositors.  This hypothesis, indeed, receives some support from the upward
trend of the share of foreign banks in total deposits as individuals move their deposits to
foreign banks since they may be considered safer than domestic banks.  To the extent that
foreign banks are less willing to lend and the prospects for borrowers of domestic banks
to receive credit from foreign banks is low, this will have an adverse impact on domestic
companies' activities, and eventually on the entire economy.
CHART M8  CHART M9
SPREAD  BETWEEN I-YEAR  TIME DEPOSITS  AND  SHARE  OF FOREIGN BANKS  IN TOTAL DEPOSITS
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26Moreover, it appears that there has been flight to quality in bank lending, as
evidenced by the upward trend  of the  share  of government  securities  in  commercial
banks' total assets.  As can be seen from Chart MI 0, banks have increased their holdings
of government securities in relation to their total assets since October 1997.  This, in turn,
may be interpreted as a sign of a  decline in banks'  willingness to lend as they devote
increasing part of their assets to risk free government securities.
CHART  MIO
THE SHARE OF GOVERNMENT  SECURITIES  IN




Although  there  has  been  a  marked  increase  in  interest  rates  and  a  sharp
weakening of  the peso following  the crisis,  the country did  not suffer from  the same
vulnerabilities  of  many  other  economies  in  the  region.  During  the period  under
consideration, neither  the general  risk premium  nor  the  bank dependent  borrowers'
specific spread shows notable increases.  Accordingly,  the usual indicators of a credit
crunch do not exist for the Philippines.
Economic growth was already slowing before the regional currency crisis hit the
Philippines in July 1997, due mainly to poor performance of the agricultural sector as the
El Nino pattern began to  take  affect.  However, the other leading  production  sector,
manufacturing,  fared much better,  partially  offsetting  the  dismal performance  of  the
agricultural sector (Chart P1).
27Despite  the  sharp depreciation  of  the currency  since July  1997, inflation  has
remained subdued (Chart P2), considerably below market expectations.  This was mainly
because of plentiful supplies of domestically produced rice --  a major component of the
food, beverage  and  tobacco  group  which  accounts for  60  percent  of the  basket.  A
significant slowdown in private consumption in response to the crisis was an additional
contributing factor to the materialization of the lower than expected inflation.
Chart  P1  Chart  P2
INDEX  OF INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION  EVOLUTION  OF INTEREST RATES  AND INFLATION
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The lower than expected inflation performance, however, did not prevent interest
rates from rising in the wake of the currency turmoil.  As can be seen from Chart P2,
interest rates have been increasing since July 1997.
Chart  P3  Chart  P4
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The  evolution  of  aggregate  credit  and  liquidity  conditions  does  not  indicate
excessive monetary tightening during the period under consideration.  At the macro level,
28real domestic credit growth (Chart P3) remained high.  Moreover, the ratio of banks' total
reserves to  deposits does not  indicate a noticeable decline; it instead exhibits a slight
downward trend to be evaluated in the light of successive cuts to the required reserve
ratio (Chart P4).
Chart P5
EVOLUTION  OF CREDIT  TO THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR'
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Disaggregated data on credit developments reveal that while domestic currency
denominated credit has been growing (Chart P5), there has been a  marked decline in
foreign currency denominated credit.
5  This chart was contributed by Bernard Funck (EACPF).
29CHART  P6  CHART  P7
SPREAD BETWEEN PESO DENOMINATED  AND  SPREAD BETWEEN  LENDING AND DEPOSIT
USD DENOMINATED DEPOSITS  RATE
10  00
I  Spread btw lending & dep. rates
Lending rate
Deposit rate
This can be explained by the increase in expected depreciation  of the peso, as
evidenced by the growing spread between peso and dollar denominated deposits (P6) and
declining  foreign  currency  deposits  in  commercial  banks.  In  addition  to  these
observations, it appears that there has not been a significant increase in the sum of the
general risk premium and the bank dependent borrowers'  specific spread as proxied by
the  spread  between  average  lending  rate  and  the  benchmark  91-day  T-bill  rate.
Consequently, the available information does not provide a notable evidence supporting
the existence of balance sheet and lending channels, and thus a credit crunch.
CHART  P8
TREND IN LENDING AND T-BILL RATES
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303.5  Thailand
On  the surface,  Thailand  does  not  appear  to  suffer from  a  serious  liquidity
crunch: monetary and credit variables along with interest rate spreads show no sign of it.
However, the available interest rate data used here are inadequate for the purpose of our
investigation. Additional data will have to be acquired before reaching afirm  conclusion
on the Thai situation.
As can be seen from the Chart TI,  it appears that increases in interest rate (Chart
T5 and Chart T6) have not been able to prevent the depreciation of the baht and restore
investors'  confidence.  There  is  strong  indication  of  a  steep  downturn:  all  output
indicators are unfavorable.  As  illustrated in Chart T2, industrial production has been
declining drastically:  it registered  a year-on-year growth rate  of -13.7  %  in  February
1998 -- a much sharper decline than had been foreseen.
The evolution of the key monetary and credit variables do not show tight liquidity
conditions.  As depicted in Chart T3, the real domestic credit exhibits an upward trend.
In addition, the  growth rate  of M2 definition  of money is also  strong, increasing  by
15.4% (year-on-year) in March 1998.
These indicators can, however, be  misleading if one concludes that there is no
credit crunch in Thailand.  Lending that is taking place could be mostly remedial -- i.e.
extending lines of credit to existing clients in difficulty to prevent a further increase in the
volume of non-performing loans.
Chart  TI  Chart  T2
EVOLUTION OF STOCK-EXCHANGE  INDEX  CHANGE  IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
AND THE EXCHANGE  RATE  (year-on-year)
01  WOO  do  in4a AOd ,  OO  ,  io  90  9909 o  '  .A2  _31
3  1In addition, bank deposits have been increasing as a result of the flight to banks
from the distressed finance companies.  Chart T4 shows how liquidity is flowing through
the banking system.
CHART T3  CHART T4
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Indeed,  the  permanent  closure  of  56  finance  companies  in  December  1997
eliminated the main source of financing for small businesses and left the consumer credit
system  in great  difficulty.  The remaining  35 finance  companies  and  15 commercial
banks were required to make higher provisions, and their percentage of non-performing
loans are expected to increase as the economic downturn deepens. 1 6
Chart T5  CHART T6
EVOLUTION  OF INTERBANK  RATE AND INFLATION  TREND IN SOME  KEY INTEREST  RATES
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Based on the latest available data from the Central  Bank, the  non-performing loans of the  banking
system represented 8.3% of total loans as of June  1997.  By December they were estimated to have
reached  18% and are expected to peak 25-30% in the middle of  1998.  In May  1998, a further  13
finance companies were closed.
32Unfortunately, because data on government  bond yields for Thailand were not
readily available, we had to  use the yield on bonds issued by state owned enterprises
without knowing the goodness of the approximation.  In addition, average bank lending
rates were also unavailable, leaving us no choice but to use the prime lending rate which
may be particularly inappropriate for gauging changes in the cost of borrowing for the
average customer in the course of a crisis.
With these caveats  in mind,  we find  no evidence of  the balance sheet or the
lending channels to be at work in Thailand.  The spread between the prime rate and the
risk-free yield shrinks in the aftermath of the crisis (Chart T8), surprisingly hint that the
General Risk Premium may have decreased.  At the same time, the wedge between the
minimum lending rate at finance companies and the prime rate widens (Chart T7), which
is consistent  with  the hypothesis  that  SMEs  suffer a  sharper  increase  in  the cost  of
borrowing.
CHART  T7  CHART TS
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It should be pointed out that the lack of evidence of a credit crunch through the
price  mechanism does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  the  shocks  hitting  Thailand
exerted a negative impact via increased credit rationing; though this conjecture cannot
be empirically validated due to lack of data.
33CHART  T9
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As can be seen from Chart T10, the share of  government securities in commercial
banks' total assets exhibits an upward trend since August  1997.  It appears that banks
have increased their holdings  of government securities  in relation to their total  assets.
This, in  turn, may be  interpreted as a  sign  of a  decline in bank  willingness to  lend,
thereby providing support to the existence of flight to quality in bank lending.
At the same time, the upward trend of the share of foreign currency deposits in
commercial banks'  total liabilities and widely documented evidence of shift of deposits
from distressed finance companies to banks suggest that there has been flight to quality
by depositors as well. Given banks'  reluctance to increase their foreign exchange risk
exposure, this shift  in composition of deposits can have a negative impact on Bank's
ability to lend.  Similarly, customers of now-closed finance companies may not be able to
establish banking relationship with new lenders immediately, thus facing an additional
obstacle in their ability to borrow.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
To what extent can tight monetary policy help restore market confidence?  This
has been a crucial question in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis.  Some have argued
that  under the prevailing circumstances, rising  real interest rates might  fail to  bolster
market confidence or might even be counter-productive." 7 Indeed, some of the features of
the East Asian economies, i.e. bank-based financial systems and high  leverage, appear
particularly conducive to a significant credit channel of transmission of monetary policy
shocks.  The magnifying  effects stemming from  this  channel render these  economies
particularly vulnerable to monetary policy shocks.  It is therefore surprising how little or
no effort has been made so far to apply the credit channel literature to help explain the
propagation of the East Asian crisis.
This paper attempts to fill this void by applying the framework derived from the
literature on the credit channel to crisis countries.  The main findings of our investigation
highlight  the  fact that  a  credit  crunch is  negatively  affecting East  Asian  economies,
particularly small-sized banks and enterprises.  Based on our findings we are inclined to
conclude that protracted and heavy reliance on tight monetary policy may be counter-
productive to restoring market confidence in  these economies.  It  would therefore be
17  For instance,  Feldstein  (1998) claims that high real interest rates caused more harm than good by
leading  to widespread  bankruptcies  and thus undermining  the prospect  of loan repayment.
35desirable to consider other policy instruments which  do not place further stress on the
banking sector and on its lending to the corporate sector.  In addition, policy actions seem
warranted  to  alleviate  the  strain  that  the  crisis  has  put  on  small-sized  banks  and
enterprises.
Our  analysis  could  be  extended  in  several  respects.  First,  although  we
deliberately left aggregate variables in the background, our results would be more robust
if they were confirmed at a lower level of aggregation.  Analyses at the sectoral or even
micro level would make important contributions to a better understanding of the credit
crunch  phenomenon.  Second,  we  presented  only  descriptive  evidence  and  our
conclusions would be further strengthen by the use of formal econometric techniques.
Finally, we touched only briefly on the policy responses that could help relieve the credit
crunch which certainly deserves further work.
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